United Factors, A  Corporation v. T. C. Associates, Inc., A Corporation, And Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., Paul J. Sugar, And Sam Herscovitz : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
United Factors, A Corporation v. T. C. Associates,
Inc., A Corporation, And Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., Paul J.
Sugar, And Sam Herscovitz : Brief of Respondent
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Alvin I. Smith; Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, United Factors v. T.C. Associates, No. 11022 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4401
IN THE SUPREME·. 
of the 
STATE OF UTAIJ···~ 
UNITED FACTORS, 
a Corporation, 
P1aintiff and Be1114MdtM 
vs . 
. T. C. ASSOCIATES, INC., 
_ a Oorporation, and . 
.. HARRY R. ULKER1 JR., 
PAUL J. SUGAR and . 
IAM HERSCOVITZ, I 
De/~<1114 
BRIEF or l~ r .... 
t .,,; ··r'r 
JAN 8 -1968 
;~--s~;;_;·;;·c;~rt. UNll 
:PETE N. VLAHOS 
302 Eccles Building 
~ 
Ogden, Utah 
Attmney /m A~ .. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS ____ 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS-------------------------------------------------- 6 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------------------------------ 8 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND ITS 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND 
SET ASIDE A STIPULATION ENTER-
ED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL 
MADE MORE THAN NINE MONTHS 
AFTER THE DATE OF THE STIPU-
LATION --------------------------------------------------------------8, 13 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION 
WHETHER THE STIPULATION BE 
DEEMED TO BE AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION OR A COMPROMISE 
AND SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS 
OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES ____________ 13, 22 
POINT III. 
ALL TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT 
HAD BEEN RESOLVED AND THERE 
WAS NO ISSUE OF LAW ____________________________ 22, 25 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENSES OF MISJOINDER 
OR CLAIMS AND PARTIES IS IN-
APPLICABLE W H E N, AS HERE, 
THERE WAS BUT A SINGLE CLAIM 
BY A SINGLE PLAINTIFF ________________________ 25, 33 
POINT V. 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
ENTER JUDGMENT __________________________________________ 33 
CONCLUSION __________________________________________________________________ 33, 34 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
Achtel vs. Lieberman, 141 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1956) ________ 21, 23 
Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. Fiddity Building and 
Loan Assn., 75 P. 2d 669 ________________________________________ 20, 21 
Bauer vs. Pacific Financing Co., 383 P. 2d 347 __________ 22, 23 
Bench vs. State Automobile & Casualty Under. etc. ! 
408 P. 2d 899 ( 1965) ____________________________________________________ 31 
Brown vs. Equitable Life Association, 
72 P. 2d 1060 ____________________________________________________________ 20, 22 
Cooke vs. Cooke, 67 U. 371, 248 P. 83 ________________________________ 33 
Hancock vs. Luke, et al, 148 P. 452 ___________________________________ J2 
Harmon vs. Yeager, et al, 110 P. 2d 352 ________________________ 9,10 , 
Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, et cil, 57 P. 2d 1132 ______________ 11, 12 
Johnson vs. Peck, 63 P. 2d 253 ______________________________________ 11, 12 
Kaipinshi vs. Kaipinshi, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 364, 366 ________________ 22 
Keyser vs. Pollock, 20 U. 371, 59 P. 87 ______________________________ 33 
Kramer vs. Pixton, 72 U. 1, 268 P. 1029 ____________________________ 33 
Laws vs. Parker Petroleum Cornpany, 237 S.W. 
2d 398 ( 1951) _______________________________________________________________ _15 
Metropolitan State Bank vs. Cox, et al, 302 P. 2d 188 ______ 15 
Northwest Oil Refining Co. vs. Honolulu Oil Corp. 
195 F. Supra 281 (1961) __________________________________ 31, 32, 33 
Opitz vs. Hayden, 17 Wash. 2d 347, 135 P. 2d 819 ____________ 22 
Stank vs. Jones, 404 P. 2d 364 (1965) ____________________ 25, 27, 28 
York Blouse vs. Kaplowitz Bros., Inc. 97 A. 
2d 465 ( 1953) ____________________________________________________________ 30, 33 
ANNOTATIONS 
_12 49 CJ 466, 520 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
13 1 CJS Sec. 4. P. 473 --------------------------------------------------------------
' 14 1 CJS, Sec. 4. P. 475 ___________ --------------------------------------------------
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3A, P. 271, # 1709 ____________ 31 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3A, P. 272-3, ::f:tl 709 ________ 32 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3A, P. 279 ________________________ 32 
Rule 13 (j) 
Rule 17 (a) 
Rule 20 (a) 
UT AH STATUTES CITED 
U.R.C.P. _________________________________________________ 24, 29, 33 
31 3~ U.R.C.P. ------------------------------------------------------·- , 
28 U.R.C.P. --------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED FACTORS, ) 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
T. C. ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Corporation, and 
I HARRY R. ULMER, JR., 
PAUL J. SUGAR and 
SAM HERSCOVITZ, 
Defendants and Appellants, 




WITH THE FACTS 
Respondent controverts the following state-
ments: 
Page 2: 
Judgment (57-58) was not granted upon oral 
Motion but was based on the affidavit of Alvin I. 
Smith (R. 46-47). 
The relief sought is more than a reversal of the 
Order (R. 54); Appellant is attempting to have the 
judgment declared null and void and set aside. 
Page 3: 
1 
Respondent denies there was any oral modifi-
cation of the guaranty either as to amount or as to 
accounts. The guarantees ( R. 25-28, Ex. B attached 
to R. 21) were unlimited in amounts and appellant 
agreed: "That the terms and conditions hereof can 
in no wise be limited or without your (respondent's) 
written consent." 
The guarantees explicitly were to cover any ac-
count factored with the respondent arising out of 
sales made prior to or after the date of execution. 
Respondent disputes that the appellants did not 
consent, accept or authorize the assignment of Evans 
and Black Carpet Mills account to respondent. The 
guarantees acknowledge liability thereunder upon 
the Factor's acceptance of any assignment or trans-
fer of an account receivable of a sale evidenced by 
an invoice. 
It must be emphasized that only the statements 1 
of Mr. Vlahos in his agreement to Judge Jeppson 
( R. 66, lines 21-24) raise the spurious claim that 
the guarantees were limited to $10,000.00. The guar-
antees themselves ( R. 25-28) are unlimited as to 
dollar amount. Mr. Herscovitz' affidavit (R. 46) 
has no mention of a $10,000.00 limit, but on con-
trary reads: "That at the time of the signing of said 
stipulation your affiant believed that the law was 
such that he would be obligated for the entire 
amount due and owing the plaintiff rather than the 
amount that he signed as a guarantor" (emphasis 
ours). We repeat, he signed no amount. 
2 
Although a summons was accepted by Mr. Vla-
hos, the judgment is based on filing of a complaint, 
the appearance of the defendants through their at-
torney, by filing a motion to set aside default (R. 
13-14) and a petition that "'each of the defendants, 
in the interest of justice, be given an opportunity to 
file their responsive pleadings". A complaint had 
been furnished to Mr. Saperstein by plaintiff's coun-
sel when counsel was advised of Mr. Vlahos' inca-
pacity. Plaintiff's counsel did not resist the motion 
and prepared the Order Setting Aside the Def a ult 
and Vacating Judgment (R. 20), in which Order 
the Court further ruled the defendants had entered 
their appearance and granted them additional time 
to August 2, 1966 in which to file an answere. The 
answer ( R. 29-34) was filed for appellants on Aug-
ust 17, 1966. 
Page 4: 
When the motion to set aside the default was 
filed, steps to have the receiver qualify were dis-
continued and counsel for the parties, together with 
other counsel for creditors, attempted to find a so-
lution to T. C. Associates' financial difficulties. An 
attachment was made by another creditor which re-
sulted in the corporation on July 28, 1966 filing a 
petition for arrangement under Chapter XI under 
the Bankruptcy Act. The arrangement was approv-
ed, but several months later when the debtor could 
not meet the terms proposed by it, it was on its own 
petition adjudged a bankrupt. 
Page 5: 
3 
Respondent disputes the conclusions that there 
was no consideration. Mr. Saperstein did not with-
draw as attorney "shortly thereafter". From Sep-
tember 19, 1966 until July 25, 1967 he continued to 
serve as appellants' attorney; during this ten month 
period, and particularly after April 1, 1967, when 
the balance was to be paid, it was only as a profes-
sional courtesy to Mr. Saperstein that the provisions 
of the stipulation were not enforced. When he was 
unsuccessful in securing a further extension of the 
last payment, after contacting United Factor's of-
ficials directly, did he withdraw. 
The stipulation ( R. 51, 52, 53) does not pro-
vide that all payments made by appellant were to 
apply on the Bailey-Schmitz account. Both appel-
lants agreed to make payments to apply against both 
accounts; any dividends received from the Chapter 
XI proceeding were to apply first against E & B 
Carpet Mills, Inc. and the balance against Bailey-
Schmi tz. 
Page 6: 
Counsel for appellants has not only misstated ' 
the above facts, but is deficient in his arithmetic. 
According to the stipulation, if payments had 
been made as agreed on April 1, 1967, a final pay· 
rnent in the sum of $3,973.12 would have paid the 
account in full. 
4 
1 i 
Unpaid principal balance ____________________ 2, 736.54 
Interest to April 1, 1967 ____________________ 747.68 
Attorney fees -------------------------------------- 500.00 
3,973.12 
By failing to comply with the terms of the 
ag1·eement a judgment was entered for: 
Unpaid Principal --------------------------------2, 736.54 
Interest to July 17, 1967 ____________________ 979.12 
Attorney's fees ------------------------------------2, 000. 00 
Court Costs ------------------------------------------ 20.00 
5,735.66 
It is thus clear that the agreed fee of $2,000.00 
and not $2,500.00 was incorporated in the judg-
ment. This fee was not based on an unpaid amount 
of $2, 736.24 but was an agreed amount to pay part 
of the respondent's reasonable legal expenses incur-
1·ed to collect $18,643.45 for which the appellants 
were responsible under the fallowing provisions of 
the guarantees: 
"The undersigned further agrees that his 
liability to you hereunder shall be primary 
and that he (they) will pay to you on demand 
without deduction by reason of offset, affir-
mative defense or counterclaim of said cus-
tomer and without previous recourse by you 
to your remedies against customer, togeth;er 
with reasonable legal expenses as may be m-
curred by you, all sums of money which may 
be due or grow due for merchandise sold or 
hereafter sold to the customer". (Emphasis 
ours) 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the record is not in chronological or-
der, we believe it would be helpful to summarize by 
dates the essential parts thereof. 
May 4, 1965. Agreements of Guarantee sign-
ed by Appellants, Herscovitz and Ulmer. (R. 25-28) 
April 5, 1966. Letter signed by T. C. Associ-
ates, Inc., Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., and Sam Herscovitz, 
in which the corporation acknowledged that there 
was due and owing $18,643.45 to the respondent 
and all parties agreed to pay the same in four in-
stallments by June 30, 1966. (R. 23-24) 
June 8, 1966. Complaint filed. (R. 1-2) 
June 30, 1966. Judgment by default for $13,· 
643.45, interest of $530.23, Attorney's fees of 
$2,000.00 and costs. (R. 37) 
July 7, 1966. Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Vacate Judgment and Order Appointing Receiver. 
( R. 14) Under Paragrah 7 of said Motion, Mr. 
Saperstein alleged that the defendants, Ulmer and 
Herscovitz, have a meritorious defense to all or a 
portion of plaintiff's claim "by reason of the fact 
that the guarantee alleged in plaintiff's complaint 
extends, by its terms, to only a portion of the claim 
sued by said plaintiff." (R. 13-14) 
July 27, 1966. Order setting aside Default and 
Vacating Judgment. In this Order the Court ruled 
defendants had entered their appearance and order· 




July 28, 1966. Petition filed by T. C. Associ-
ates for an Arrangement under Chapter XI of the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
August 8, 1966. Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. (R. 21) 
August 17, 1966. Answer of Defendants Har-
ry Ulmer and Sam Herscovitz filed. (R. 29-34) 
September 19, 1966. Stipulation of Alvin I. 
Smith, Herschel Saperstein, Harry Ulmer and Sam 
Herscovitz. (R. 51-53) 
April 7, 1966 to February 27, 1967. 
Payments against original principal 
claim of ___________ ---------------------- --------------------_$18, 643.45 
April 7, 1966 ------------------ 5,000.00 
September 20, 1966 ______ 3,000.00 
October 6, 1966 ____________ 1,317.88 
November 7, 1966 ________ 1,317.88 
December 6, 1966 __________ 1,317.88 
January 6, 1967 ____________ 1,317.88 
February 7, 1967 __________ 1,317.88 
February 7, 1967 __________ 1,317.88 
15,907.28 
$ 2,736.17 
July 25, 1967. Motion to Set Aside Stipulation 
to File Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 
43-47) 
August 16, 1967. Affidavit of balance unpaid. 
(R. 55-56) 
August 17, 1967. Judgment. (R. 57-58) 
7 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. The Trial Court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying appellants' motion to amend its 
answer ~nd counterclaim and set aside a stipulation 
e;itered mto between the parties and their respec-
tive counsel made more than nine months after the 
date of the stipulation. 
Point 2. There was consideration whether the 
stipulation be deemed to be an accord and satisfac-
tion or a com promise and settlement of the claims 
of the respective parties. 
Point 3. All triable issues of fact had been re· 
solved and there was no issue of law. 
Point 4. The defenses of misjoinder or claims 
and parties is inapplicable when, as here, there was 
but a single claim by a single plaintiff. 
Point 5. The Court had jurisdiction to enter 
judgment. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM AND SET ASIDE A STIPU-
LATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUN-
AFTER THE DATE OF THE STIPULATION. 
Appellants are asking the Court to reverse the 
Trial Court's denial of a Motion to Vacate the Stipu-
lation and for leave to file a Counterclaim and 
Amend Complaint (R. 43) after they have filed an 
answer to a complaint asserting defenses and deny-
ing personal liability as to one of the counts a~d 
after a Stipulation (R. 51) by the parties and then 
8 
counsel in which appellants admit personal liability 
on all counts of the complaint. 
Appellants contended that the case of Harmon 
vs. Yeager, et al, 110 P. 2d 352, sets forth the ap-
plicable law on amendments in the State of Utah 
and claim the facts in this case are on all fours with 
the facts in the case here on Appeal. 
We agree that the law cited therein is control-
ling. Appellants quoted from the court in Harman 
vs. Yeager, supra, as follows: 
"Viewing the motion therefore as a 
speaking demurrer, when the answer was held 
to be had and the defendants sought to amend, 
they should have been granted such right 
unless 'Under the facts admitted there was no 
reasonable probability that they could state a 
defense or make an issue on a matter material 
to plaintiff's cause of action. (Emphasis ad-
ded) 
The court in reversing the judgment of the trial 
court granting a judgment on the pleadings observ-
ed: 
"We think these matters, while perhaps 
not constituting a positive denial of plaintiff's 
allegations, certainly cannot be said to be an 
admission of plaintiff's claims. They mani-
fest an effort to join issue, and when leave to 
amend was asked the court should have grant-
ed the same." 
In the instant case, after joinder of the issues, 
appellants admitted liability on all counts of respon-
9 
dent's complaint in the stipulation signed by the 
parties and their attorneys, while in the case of Har-
man vs. Yeager, the pleadings, i.e. complaint and 
original inarticluate answer, joined issue on matfors 
which had not then been resolved. 
Since all of respondent's allegations were ad-
mitted in the Stipulation there was no reasonable 
probability that appellants could state a defense and 
the Motion to Amend was properly denied. In fact, 
in the present case appellants had an opportunity 
to and did deny liability as to the E & B Carpet Mills 
account in their answer ( R. 32), while in the Stipu-
lation (R. 51) they admit personal liability to that 
debt. Appellants should not be allowed to constantly 
traverse their own personal liability to that debt. 
Appellants should not be allowed to constantly tra· 
verse their own position in order to suit their then 
present desires. 
None of the cases cited by appellants involved 
the granting of a Motion to Amend following the 
entering of judgment pursuant to a stipulation 
which was entered into after the suit had commenc· 
ed, issues joined, and the case was ready for 
trial and research has revealed no such cases to re· 
spondent. 
Further the additional cases listed by appellant 
are distinguishable as to the facts and the law re· 
lied on. 
Respondent agrees with the geenral principles 
10 
enumerated in Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, et al, 57 
P. 2d 1132, but submits that the sentence immedi-
ately following the quotation cited by appellants is 
more applicable to the facts here on appeal: 
"On the other hand it has been said that 
well-established principles and precedents are 
not to be lightly set aside, and that amend-
ments are to be allowed in furtherance of 
justice and not as a reward for indifference 
or neglect, or where prejudicial to the rights 
of the adverse party or placing him at an un-
fari disadvantage. Further, the liberality ex-
ercised in allowing amendments is greatest at 
the time the law suit is commenced and de-
creases as the suit progresses, and the rule 
granting amendments changes to the disad-
vantage of applicant upon each new amend-
ment being allowed." 
A settlement by stipulation is a termination of 
litigation and highly favored in the law and once 
executed by the parties and their counsel, liberality 
toward amendments ceases, for litigation has ceased. 
The case of Johnson vs. Peck, 63 P. 2d 253, 
stands for the proposition that a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow amendment 
after trial and submission of the case. The court in 
Johnson vs. Jeck, supra, observed: 
HThe policy of the law is toward liberal-
ity in the allowance of amendments and to re-
gard them with favor to the end that the real 
controversy bet~ee~ the parties may_ be se!r 
tled. The liberality is greatest at the ti~e smt 
is commenced and decreases as the smt pro-
11 
gresses. The Trial Court has a broad discre-
tion in the matter of amendments to plead-
ings. 49 C. J. 466, 520; Johnson vs. Brinkel'-
hoff (Utah) 57 P. (2d) 1132. Where amend-
ments to pleadings are offered so long after 
trial and submission of the case, and after 
decision of the court is announced, the parties 
offering such amendments have no standing 
to complaint if their offer is refused. The 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing the filing of such paper." 
Since the compromise and settlement of a claim 
reduced to writing, signed by the parties and their 
counsel and made part of the record is as much a 
final disposition of litigation as a judgment after 
trial and highly favored in the law "to secure the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action" Rule 1 ( d), the Trial Court has not abused 
its discretion and appellants have no standing to 
complain under the rationale of Johnson vs. Peck, 
supra. 
Appellants cite the case of Hancock vs. Luke, 
et al, 148 P. 452. In that case, however, immediately 
after the court ruled sustaining plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment, defendant's counsel asked for leave 
to amend his answer. 
Respondent would agree that a request for leave 
to amend at that stage of the proceedings was time-
ly. However, immediately following the portion 
quoted by appellants, the court observed: 
"Nor can we conceive how any one can 
12 
say in advance that in this case at least a par-
tial defense may not be set forth by a proper 
arnendment to the answer. Nor can we see 
how it can successfully be contended that the 
motion for leave to amend was not timely 
made, or that prejudice or undue delay will 
result if allowed." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case not only was the Motion to 
Amend not timely in that it was made one year after 
the original answer, almost 10 months after the stip-
ulation had been executed and the appellants had 
made payments thereunder, but the trial court be-
fore which appellant made its Motion to Amend and 
Vacate the Stipulation could say in advance that no 
defense could be interposed, for appellants had ad-
mitted respondent's entire case in the stipulation 
( R. 51) and on previous occasions. In addition, re-
spondent would be greatly prejudiced in that it had 
relied to its detriment on the executed stipulation 
for an extended period of time without proceeding 
to trial on the merits. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION WHETHER 
THE STIPULATION BE DEEMED TO BE AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OF A COM-
P R 0 M I S E AND SETTLEMENT OF THE 
CLAIMS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES. 
Appellant quotes 1 C.J.S.-Accord and Satisfac-
tion, Section 4, Page 473. This section contains in 
addition the following: 
"This is all that the law requires by way 
of consideration, and broadly speaking, where-
ever a creditor receives from a substituted 
13 
contract a distinct benefit which he otherwise 
would not have had, such benefit is sufficient 
to uphold the accord and satisfaction." 
P. 4 7 5 - "Where the claim or demand 
constitutes the subject matter of the accord is 
a disputed one, or unliquidated, the mere ad-
justment of the dispute or agreement of ac-
cord affords, of itself, sufficient considera-
tion for the accord, whether or not the latter 
has been actually executed and satisfaction 
had; and it 1nay be added that it is ordinarily 
the only consideration in such case." ( Empha-
sis added) 
Respondent agrees with the principles stated 
above, and assuming the stipulation was an accord 
and satisfaction, submits that there was considera-
tion within the meaning of those principles last 
above ref erred to. 
Appellant cannot now maintain that the claim 
was not disputed, for in answer to respondent's com-
plaint, appellants denied personal liability as to the 
E and B Carpet account ( R. 31) , entered in to a 
stipulation admitting personal liability as to both 
accounts (R. 51) and then after default under the 
terms of the stipulation sought to set aside the stip-
ulation on the ground that the personal guarantee 
was made as to the Bailey-Schmitz account and not 
to E & B Carpets. (This is the same disputed matter 
raised by appellant prior to the execution of the stip-
ulation). Thus since there was a real dispute, the 
settlement thereof constituted "sufficient consider· 




The paragraph above stated was followed by 
the court in Laws vs. Parker Petroleum Company, 
237 S.W. 2d 398 (1951) which observed: 
"An accord is an agreement for the dis-
charge of an obligation. The execution of this 
agreement is a satisfaction. Such an agree-
ment must be based upon a valid considera-
tion. The settlement of a claim, liquidated or 
unliquidated which has been disputed in good 
faith is of itself sufficient consideration to 
support the agreement." (Emphasis added) 
Appellants cite Metropolitan State Bank vs. 
Cox, et al, 302 P. 2d 188, for the proposition that an 
accord entered into as a result of a mistake of one 
of the parties results in a lack of meeting of the 
minds and hence an absence of consideration. 
We submit that the following facts present in 
this case demonstrate a distinction from the above 
case in that no mistake of fact or law exists. 
In spite of the fact that counsel for Appellant, 
and Appellant Herscovitz, by affidavit (R. 46-47) 
attempted to convince Judge Jeppson and are now 
urging to this Court that the stipulation and par-
ticularly the substance thereof was entered into 
without full disclosure of the facts to counsel, the 
record and the background, prior to the stipulation, 
demonstrate that from the very beginning Appel-
lants have had every opportunity to protect their 
legal rights. The Trial Court in refusing to vacate 
the stipulation quickly reached this conclusion after 
having reviewed the file : 
15 
"You are not telling me your clients made 
a mistake. In fact you say they failed to com-
municate to their attorney. I cannot get into 
the question of how much a client tells his at-
torney. I have got to assume the attorneys are 
fully informed by their clients." (R. 70, L. 
17-21) 
The following events demonstrate that the client 
had full opportunity to advise their counsel and . 
everything points to the fact that they had previous-
ly advised counsel of every defense they might have 
had. 
Before the letter of April 5, 1965, which was 
signed by all of the parties, a full discussion of the 
claim of $18,643.45, plus attorney's fees, was had 
with respondent's counsel. Prior to June 13, 1966 
when Mr. Vlahos was incapacitated, on June 1, 1966, 
he (Vlahos) after telephoning, wrote counsel for 
respondent. We quote applicable parts thereof: 
"This will confirm your conversation 
with me by phone on May 26th, 1966 - pur-
suant to said conversation please be advised 
that in addition to the $5,000.00 already paid 
on this account an additional $5,000.00 will 
be paid on or before May 31st or June 1st, 
1966, and an additional $5,000.00 on or be-
fore June 30th, 1966 an dthe balance of $3,-
643.45 will be paid by July 15, 1966." 
We must assume that at this time his client, 
Mr. Herscovitz, had discussed the facts of the case 
with him or he would not have taken it upon him-
self to acknowledge this obligation. 
16 
Appellants' former counsel, Mr. Saperstein, in 
his motion to set aside the default and vacate judg-
ment (R. 13-14) sets out in great detail a summary 
of the defenses the parties defendant had to the 
claim. All of the reasons now being advanced by 
present counsel to vacate the stipulation were sum-
marized in this motion and were discussed inform-
ally by Mr. Saperstein with respondent's counsel. 
The issues raised were : 
1. The guarantee applied only to a portion of 
the claim. 
2. The guarantee did not include the Evans 
and Black Carpet Mills account. 
3. The written garantee could be modified by 
an oral agreement. 
4. The right to attorney's fees. 
5. The right to setoffs. 
Although respondent's counsel did not agree 
that legally the guarantors could prevail either in 
law or fact on the above issues, he did agree that de-
fendents should have their day in court by having 
the court vacate the judgment. 
The day after the above motion was filed the 
corporation represented by Mr. Saperstein filed a 
petition for an Arrangement under Chapter XI of 
the Bankruptcy Act; under the plan proposed, the 
entire claim was to have been paid by April 1, 1967. 
In addition, the mistake of fact purportedly 
17 
made by appellants and supposedly not communi-
cated to their attorney, is that the stipulation obli-
gated them to pay "in excess of their guaranty" (R. 
67) ; this was specifically raised by their attorney. 
In answer to the complaint their attorney pleaded 
an affirmative defense to part of the claim when he 
observed: 
"It was further represented by plaintiff 
to these defendants at the time of the execu-
tion of said agreement of guarantee that the 
only factored account to which said agreement 
of guarantee would apply was that of Bailey-
Schmitz." (R. 31) 
Defendants' counsel thereafter urged that there 
was no reason to argue the case under the Motion 
for Summary Judgment or to set the case down for 
trial because payment would be made in due course, 
and under any circumstances the individual appel-
lants would agree to make the payments as later ar-
ranged in the stipulation and could then recoup 
them from the dividends paid by the bankruptcy 
court. When the final draft of the stipulation was 
prepared by appellant's counsel, it was distinctly 
understood by all of the parties that all of the above 
issues were being resolved in the same manner as 
they could have been either at the conclusion of a 
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, or 
on a settlement approved at a pretrial. 
In order that there could be no misunderstand-
ing of the terms of settlement, a conference was ar-
18 
ranged in the offices of Mr. Ulmer at which meeting 
both appellants and both counsel were present. It is 
true that Mr. Herscovitz argued at great length 
against the final agreement, which was reached 
after a half day session. So that there would be no 
question that the stipulation conformed with the 
understanding of the principals involved, both coun-
sel insisted that Ulmer and Herscovitz sign the same 
individually and be named as parties to the stipula-
tion. 
Only after they had made payments according 
to the terms of the stpulation from September, 1966 
to February, 1967 (R. 56) did appellants seek to 
avoid the stipulation. After Mr. Saperstein with-
drew having advised them that they were obligated 
to pay the balance under the terms of the stipulation, 
1 if they wished to avoid the entry of a judgment 
against them ( R. 65-66) , through new counsel they 
asked the trial court to believe that they entered 
into the stipulation under a mistake of fact, again 
traversing their previous position. 
A reading of the transcript indicates that Judge 
Jeppson was particularly interested in being advised 
what new matters existed and could be asserted in 
an amended answer. We submit that neither by 
affidavit nor by the responsive answers of Mr. Vla-
hos has a single new issue being raised that was not 
previously raised and discussed and then resolved 
by the stipulation. 
The purpose in attempting to set aside the stip-
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ulation was so that the judgment provided therein 
could not be entered. The provisions of Rule 60 (b) 
therefore apply. Judge Jeppson so applied them, 
but appellants have failed to supply any reason such 
as mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered evi-
dence, fraud, or any other customary ground. In 
view of the record, the trial court's position should 
not be reversed for there can be no mistake of fact 
claimed by one who asserts the same defense before 
and after the execution of a stipulation. 
With the principles cited by appellant in Brown 
vs. Equitable Life Association, 72 P. (2d) 1060, we 
fully agree, but the court further observed: 
"There must be consideration for the 
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or 
disputed claim, where the parties are apart in 
good faith presents such consideration." (Em-
phasis added. ) 
The court reasoned that there was not accord and 
satisfaction because the claim "was filed and paid 
in accordance with the demand with no dispute". On 
the other hand, they observed that: 
"If a dispute between the parties had 
arisen regarding this matter of partial and 
liability, and was before the court, and the 
plaintiff had then agreed to the settlement of 
July 2, 1934, it would have been an accord 
and satisfaction." 
Again, we agree with the general principles 
quoted by appellants in Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. 
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Fidelity Building and Loan Assn., 75 P. 2d 669, 
but the court again repeated the following rule: 
"There must be consideration for the 
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or 
disputed claim where the parties are apart in 
good faith presents such consideration." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the Badger case the court states that plaintiff 
relied upon information given it by defendant and 
"until it received information other than that fur-
nished by defendant, it had no basis upon which to 
predicate a dispute." 
We have pointed out previously that there was 
a genuine dispute, contested issues pleaded and a 
settlement thereof by stipulation. It pushes credi-
bility to believe that appellant could now urge the 
parties had no good faith dispute as to the amount 
of the claim owed by appellants to respondent and 
the court should find consideration in the settlement 
of a disputed claim. 
Respondent submits that the stipulation was 
really a compromise and settlement of a disputed 
claim and that the line of cases under this category 
are controlling rather than cases involving accord 
and satisfaction. In Achtel vs. Lieberman, 141 N.Y. 
S. 2d 7 50 ( 1956) the court observed: 
"To permit settlement so made to be va-
cated except upon a showing of good cause 
therefor, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, ac-
cident or some other ground of the same na-
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ture - would open the door to possible abuse 
and make litigation interminable-. The fol-
low.in.g la?guage of the case of Kaipinshi vs. 
Kaipins~i, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 364, 366, is aptly 
persuasive here: 
'The plaintiff is bound by the stipulation 
and it is valid and enforceable. The courts 
look with favor upon agreements and stipula-
tions to end litigation, and will enforce them 
if possible -. In fact, it is the duty of the 
court to enforce the stipulation in this case'.'' 
In Opitz vs. Hayden, 17 Wash. 2d, 347, 135 P. 
2d 819, the court observed as to compromise and 
settlement: 
"The real consideration which each party 
receives under such a compromise is, accord-
ing to some authorities, not the sacrifice of 
the right, but the settlement of the dispute." 
Utah makes a distinction without real signifi-
cance between accord and satisfaction and compro-
mise and settlement in that with both if there is a 
disputed claim, the consideration required is sup-
plied through the settlement of that dispute. Brown 
vs. Equitable Life Assoc. Soc., Supra. 
Under either accord and satisfaction or com-
promise and settlement since there was a good faith 
settlement of a dispute, that settlement presents the 
required consideration. 
POINT III 
ALL TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT HAD BEEN 
RESOLVED AND THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF 
LAW. 
Appellant cites Bauer vs. Pacific Financing Co., 
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383 P. 2d 347, for the proposition that on a Motion 
to dismiss doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
pleader in order to allow him an opportunity to pre-
sent his proof. We submit this rule is inapplicable 
when, as here, the parties and their counsel have 
entered into a stipulation resolving disputed matters 
arising out of the filing of a complaint and answer 
thereto. Where the parties have resolved a dispute 
and provided in a stipulation that if a default oc-
curs, "the court may enter, without notice to the de-
fendants, judgment against defendants", (R. 51) 
the reason for the principal has terminated along 
with all disputes arising out of the litigation. At this 
point a new principle emerges which is to encourage 
a termination of hostilities by settlement short of 
trial. Achtel vs. Lieberman, supra. 
Appellants then maintain that since they de-
nied all of the allegations contained in respondent's 
complaint ( R. 29-34) and specifically denied the 
guaranty of any amount on the E & B Carpet Mill 
account, there is therefore a triable issue of fact but 
they ignore the facts, once again, in their argument 
in that subsequent to their denial they and their at-
torney signed a stipulation admitting all contested 
matters (R. 51) and made payments acknowledging 
that agreement of five ( 5) months. Then being un-
able to further perform they, through new counsel, 
sought to set aside the stipulation and amend their 
answer ( R. 43) on the ground that they were mis-
taken as to their liability as against E & B Carpet 
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Mills and failed to inform their counsel of the facts 
' obligating themselves to pay in "excess of the guar-
anty". (R. 67) 
Respondent fails to see how the court can be- 1 
lieve that appellants were mistaken as to facts pur-
portedly limiting their liability when that defense 
was specifically raised in their answer. (R. 31) 
Appellant further maintain on Page 25 of their 
brief that "unless Bailey-Schmitz is forced to be-
come a party in their action that justice will not be 
obtained and the result would be unconcionable be-
cause the appellants would have to bring legal action 
in the State of California against Bailey-Schmitz 
Qn their setoff when all of said issues should be 
handled at one time in an effort to avoid multiple 
suits." This contention is unsound on its face for 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 (j) provides: 
'". . . any claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim which have been asserted against an 
assignor, at the time of or before notice of 
such assignment, may be asserted against his 
assignee, to the extent that such claim, coun-
terclaim or cross-claim does not exceed recov-
ery upon the claim of the assignee." 
Therefore, the right of set-off could have been 
determined had the case proceeded to trial. The fact 
that the stipulation provided that appellants reserv-
ed rights of setoff against Bailey-Schmitz is not ma-
terial as against respondent for the personal guar-
antee acknowledged and admitted by appellants (R. 
51) provided that all payments would be made "on 
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demand without deduction by reason of set off, de-
fense, or counterclaim." (R. 25) That provision in 
the stipulation was merely a compromise by respon-
dent, for had the case gone to trial appellants would 
have been barred from asserting a setoff against re-
spondent by reason of their express waiver in the 
guaranty. 
Thus there was no triable issue of law or fact 
before the trial court and appellants' Motion to file 
an amended answer and counterclaim was properly 
dismissed. 
POINT IV 
THE D E F E N S E S OF MISJOINDER OF 
CLAIMS AND PARTIES IS INAPPLICABLE 
WHEN, AS HERE, THERE WAS BUT A 
SINGLE CLAIM BY A SINGLE PLAINTIFF. 
The case cited by appellants as controlling is 
distinguishable in Fact and principle from the case 
presented on appeal. 
The case of Stank vs. Jones, 404 P. 2d 364 
( 1965) is factually distinguishable in that it involv-
ed seven (7) distinct claimants with twelve (12) 
independent causes of action having unrelated facts 
who assigned their claims to the plaintiff for pur-
poses of suit and collection. The assignors retained 
a two-third interest in the amount to be collected. 
In the instant case respondent-plaintiff pur-
chased the accounts receivable from the assignors 
who retained no interest therein (Rl, 8, 9, 25, 27). 
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Appellants' liability is not based on two separate 
claims but on appellants' personal guarantee for 
payment for "all merchandise sold or which is here-
after sold. . .. by you (respondent herein) and for 
any one or more of your FACTORED ACCOUNTS." 
(R. 25) 
Specifically, the judgment appealed from was 
against appellants in their individual capacity as a 
result of their personal guarantees and the objec-
tion as to misjoinder of plaintiffs and claims is in-
applicable here, there being only one plaintiff with 
one claim arising out of a single guarantee. (see 
pa. 5 of complaint, R. 2) 
An analogous, but distinguishable, situation is 
that of a plaintiff who purchased two notes both 
made by the same maker, but having two separate 
payees. There is no doubt that a holder in due course 
of both notes could file a single complaint against 
the single defendant-maker by stating in a complaint 
two counts. The liability and the right to proceed in 
a single complaint is analogous to respondent-plain-
tiff's claim against defendant, T. C. Associates. On 
the other hand the case here on appeal arises out of 
a judgment against appellants in their individual 
capacity and is not predicated upon two claims, but 
a single claim based on their personal guarantee for 
payment of "any and all merchandise sold or which 
is hereafter sold ... " ( R. 25) 
In essence, the action was one brought by re-
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spondent-plaintiff against the guarantors of a run-
ning account debt. 
Not only may Stank vs. Jones, supra. be dis-
tinguished on the facts, but it is also distinguishable 
on principle. 
The majority opinion in Stank vs. Jones, supra. 
struck at the evil of allowing multiple claimants to 
avoid the rule on permissive joinder by assignment 
to an assignee for collection. The court observed: 
"Here we have an action wherein the 
plaintiff, an assignee for collection, appears 
to invoke Rule 18(a) 3 and circumvent Rule 
20(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Seven different claimants have assigned 
twelve different, distinct, and unrelated 
claims to the plaintiff. Plaintiff is to retain 
one-third of any moneys collected and the 
assignor is to receive the remaining two-
thirds. Under such circumstances should 
plaintiff be permitted, as he has done here, 
to join all of these claims against the defen-
dant in one action? We think not. Yet, it can 
be argued that, inasmuch as the plaintiff is 
the real party in interest, he may prosecute 
this action by virtue of Rule 18 (a) and join 
therein all claims, both legal and equitable, 
which his assignors might have against the 
defendant. Such a conclusion cannot be toler-
ated. 
(Footnote 3) "If the assignee sues at law, he is turn-
ed out of court, and if the assignor sues in equity, 
he is turned out also ... The true rule undoubtedly 
is that which prevails i nthe court of equity, that 
he who has the right is the person to pursue the 
remedy. We have adopted this rule. First Report of 
the Commissioner on Practice and Pleadings, N.Y. 
(1848) 124." (Emphasis added.) 
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"Obviously, the seven assignors could not 
have joined as plaintiffs and asserted their 
diverse and unrelated claims in one action 
against the defen~an~. Why, then, should they 
be allowed to do md1rectely what they could 
not do directely? The answer is that they 
should not." 
In the Stank case the seven unrelated claimants 
assigned one-third ( 1/3 ) of their interests in claims 
against the debtor-defendant who had not executed 
a personal guarantee to pay any and all claims as-
signed to the assignee, thereby avoiding the require-
ment of Rule 20(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that multiple plaintiffs "may join in one ac-
tion ... if they assert any right to relief ... in re-
spect of or arising out of the same transaction, oc-
curance, or series of transactions or occurances ... " 
In the instant case there was no attempt to avoid 
the rigors of Rule 20 (a), nor is that Rule herein 
applicable for there was but one plaintiff with but 
one claim arising out of the execution of a personal 
guarantee and thus the principle set forth in the 
majority opinion is neither thwarted, nor is it ap-
plicable. 
In his concuring opinion, Justice Henroid ex-
pressed the fear that an assignee might gather up 
separate and unrelated claims against a single de-
fendant forcing him to defend them all in a single 
proceeding and for a single filing fee. Justice Hen· 
roid observed in Stank vs. Jones, supra.: 
"If this case were decided otherwise, a 
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person could have one claim by assignment, 
and then could go around gathering up ten 
others against a defendant, all unrelated, and 
force the defendant to meet all of them in one 
suit, with a single filing fee and before a 
single jury." 
In the instant case, as noted previously, there 
is but one claim by a single claimant and the ration-
ale of the concurring opinion of avoiding a situation 
where one is forced to meet many unrelated claims 
brought by an assignee with a isngle filing fee is 
not applicable for liability arose out of the execution 
of a personal guarantee in favor of a single factor, 
respondent herein. 
As to appellants' argument that the assignors 
should be joined to avoid irreparable injury due to 
their right of set off against Bailey-Schmitz, re-
spondent submits that this is without merit on two 
grounds. 
First, we have previously argued the signifi-
cance of Rule 13 (j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Therefore since the right to allowances of 
the setoff against Bailey-Schmitz could have been 
heard, had the case proceeded to trial, without join-
ing Bailey-Schmitz, the appellants cannot claim ir-
reparable injury. 
Second, appellants specifically waived their 
right of setoff and counterclaim in their personal 
guarantee (R. 25-28) and if the case were to pro-
ceed to trial the matter could not be heard for that 
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reason. The right of setoff preserved in the stipula-
tion was merely a compromise made by respondent 
and if said stipulation were to be vacated as suggest-
ed by appellants the guarantee would then govern, 
barring the assertion of said setoff. 
Further, had respondent sought leave to add 
the assignors as addition al parties the court would 
properly have denied the request. The court in Yark 
Blouse Corp. vs. Kaplowitz Bros., Inc., 97 A. 2d 465 
(1953) observed: 
"In this jurisdiction an assignee of an 
open account may sue for the same in his own 
name, and rule 17 (a) of the trial court re-
quires that every action shall be brought in 
the name of the real party in interest. When 
substantive law gives an assignee the right 
to sue in his own name and rule of court re-
quires suit by the real party in interest, ac-
tion on an assigned claim must be brought 
by the assignee in his own name. Having sold 
or assigned its claim against defendant, plain-
tiff no longer had a right to enforce that 
claim. Fashion Fan had the right by substan-
tive law to enforce the claim and was there-
fore the real party in interest. Not only was 
Fashion Fan the real party in interest, it was 
an indispensable party. When the rights of an 
assignee will be affected by an action, the as-
signee in an indipensable party .... 
"At trial plaintiff asked leave to add as 
additional parties plaintiff the stockholders of 
plaintiff corporation. This request was prop- 1 
erly denied. Since the corporation .had sold its 
claim, its stockholders had no rights there-
to . ... " (Emphasis added.) 
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It has also been held that an action brought by 
the assignor of a complete assignment of a chose in 
action should be dismissed since it was not prosecut-
ed in the name of the real party in interest. Bench 
vs. State Automobile & Casulty Under. etc., 408 P. 
2d 899 (1965). 
In conformity with the above the court in 
Northwest Oil & Refining Co. vs. Honolulu Oil Corp. 
195 F supra 281 ( 1961), observed: 
"Plaintiff, having assigned all its rights, 
title and interest in the contract, no longer 
has any interest therein and may not accord-
ingly maintain the action ... Where all rights 
under a contract have been transferred the 
assignee is the real party in inte:t;-est." 
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure provides that every action shall be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
The purpose of the real party in interest rule 
is set forth in Moore's Federal Practice, vol 3A, p. 
271 # 1709 as follows: 
"The primary purpose of the real party 
in interest provision was to change the com-
mon law rule that an action upon an assigned 
chose in action had to be prosecuted in the 
name of the assignor." 
The cases above quoted are in accord with the 
principle that the assignee of a complete chose in 
action is the real party in interest and that a suit 
brought in the name of the assignor should be dis-
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missed and leave sought to join the as~ 
be denied for the reason that the assig1 
has any interest in the matter. 
If the facts here on appeal involveo , _ 
al assignee for collection a different result migia 
warranted, but since it involved a co· 
ment of a chose in action the courts a 
observed in Moore's Federal Practice, " 
272-3, # 17.09 as follows: 
"'The federal courts, in construing the 
real party in interest provisj - · ,, of various 
state codes, and all of the stati JC' •, r ' 
struing their own provisions, r 
accord in holding that the um 
signee of a complete chose in at: 
party in interest and suit must 
hi.(] name." (Emphasis added.) 
Moore P. 279 
"Whether an assignee fo1· L~•i on1y, 
who has a duty of accountah1 11 to his as-
signor, can sue in his own na'. mder a real 
party in interest provision hc.w aused some 
variance of opinion among the cuurts." 
Since the respondent was the J.nqualified as-
signee of a complete chose in action, the owner of 
the legal title and beneficial interest to the exclusion 
of the assignor he is the real party in interest with 
the meaning of Rule 17 (a) of th1~ Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and entitled to sue 1 his own name. 
Therefore, since an action, brought by the as-
signors would have been dismissed, Northwest Oil & 
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;vs. Honolulu Oil Corp. supra; leave to 
· ";inors as parties plaintiff would proper-
denied, York Blouse Corp. vs. Kaplo-
,L nc., 97 A 2d 465 ( 1953) and the setoff 
dist Bailey-Schmitz could have been heard under 
· "''=' ·,·:.:, rrf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
·· . , ;g the assignors, appellants' claim of 
, . -~· 1..,rJUry is unfounded in fact and in law. 
POINT V 
THE COUIIT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
JUDGMP.T'.'.1\· 
·. t'(Lf) '):; 
. . 'fl: out previously this action was com-
... u·' ~ ':'1 i:;filing of a Complaint. Any prior de-
. <
1 
·IClJ:Was cured by defendant's general ap-
, • · '· 
1 
f3-14), the Order dated July 27, 1966, 
'ne Answer filed August 17, 1966 (R. 
,,, : ' ·> rr(\';' "f 
See i: .. ·." .~~:r vs. Pollock, 20 U. 371, 59 P. 87; 
Kramer vs. ·''ton, 72 U. 1, 268 P. 1029; Cooke vs. 
Cooke, 67 l•. ~'lil, 248 P. 83. 
tY. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellaI;J.ts' motion to set aside the stipula-
tion and for leave to file an amended answer and 
counterclaim fo0 the following reasons more fully 
enumerated he~· .. tofore: The Motion was not timely 
made and ~f g~anted would be prejudicial to the 
rights of r~spondent and would discourage settle-
ment of litigation; there was good consideration in 
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the settlement of a disputed claim; there was no 
triable issues of fact and law for they had all been 
resolved in the settlement of the disputed claim after 
joinder of issue in the complaint and answer there-
to; the defenses of misjoinder of claims and parties 
are inapplicable because there was but one claim by 
a single claimant; and any defect in jurisdiction 
was cured by appellants' general appearances and 
answer to respondent's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AL VIN I. SMITH 
1309 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Respondent 
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